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BTC FLASH - FAKE BTC - Free Software

Logo of telegram channel vanishingcoin — BTC FLASH - FAKE BTC - Free Software B
Logo of telegram channel vanishingcoin — BTC FLASH - FAKE BTC - Free Software
Channel address: @vanishingcoin
Categories: Cryptocurrencies
Language: English
Subscribers: 182
Description from channel

✅ Flash BTC
✅ Fake Bitcoin Transaction
✅ Admin @VCoin4u

Ratings & Reviews

4.50

2 reviews

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The latest Messages 2

2022-01-06 23:21:50 BTC FLASH - FAKE BTC - Free Software pinned «Which one do you prefer?»
20:21
Open / Comment
2022-01-06 23:20:43
Which one do you prefer?
Anonymous Poll
49%
Flash Bitcoin Software for Windows?
0%
Flash Bitcoin Software for Mac OS?
2%
Flash Bitcoin Software for Linux?
44%
Flash Bitcoin Software for Andorid?
5%
Flash Bitcoin Software for iOS?
120 voters481 views20:20
Open / Comment
2022-01-05 22:16:05 Channel name was changed to «BTC FLASH - FAKE BTC - Free Software»
19:16
Open / Comment
2021-12-31 03:40:42 BTC FLASH - FAKE BTC - Free Software pinned « My new windows app should be ready soon. I will offer the trial version for free for those who add 200 members to my channel. With the free version, you can send 0.1 Flash BTC weekly. For 1 month. Then you should purchase the license. If you are…»
00:40
Open / Comment
2021-12-31 03:40:35
My new windows app should be ready soon.

I will offer the trial version for free for those who add 200 members to my channel.

With the free version, you can send 0.1 Flash BTC weekly. For 1 month.

Then you should purchase the license.

If you are interested to sign up for free trial please DM me.
831 views00:40
Open / Comment
2021-12-04 01:43:15 Closing Negotiation: closing_signed
Once shutdown is complete and the channel is empty of HTLCs, the final current commitment transactions will have no HTLCs, and closing fee negotiation begins. The funder chooses a fee it thinks is fair, and signs the closing transaction with the scriptpubkey fields from the shutdown messages (along with its chosen fee) and sends the signature; the other node then replies similarly, using a fee it thinks is fair. This exchange continues until both agree on the same fee or when one side fails the channel.

type: 39 (closing_signed)
data:
[32:channel_id]
[8:fee_satoshis]
[64:signature]
Requirements
The funding node:

after shutdown has been received, AND no HTLCs remain in either commitment transaction:
SHOULD send a closing_signed message.
The sending node:

MUST set fee_satoshis less than or equal to the base fee of the final commitment transaction.
SHOULD set the initial fee_satoshis according to its estimate of cost of inclusion in a block.
MUST set signature to the Bitcoin signature of the close transaction.
The receiving node:

if the signature is not valid for either variant of closing transaction:
MUST fail the connection.
if fee_satoshis is equal to its previously sent fee_satoshis:
SHOULD sign and broadcast the final closing transaction.
MAY close the connection.
otherwise, if fee_satoshis is greater than the base fee of the final commitment transaction:
MUST fail the connection.
if fee_satoshis is not strictly between its last-sent fee_satoshis and its previously-received fee_satoshis, UNLESS it has since reconnected:
SHOULD fail the connection.
if the receiver agrees with the fee:
SHOULD reply with a closing_signed with the same fee_satoshis value.
otherwise:
MUST propose a value "strictly between" the received fee_satoshis and its previously-sent fee_satoshis.
Rationale
The "strictly between" requirement ensures that forward progress is made, even if only by a single satoshi at a time. To avoid keeping state and to handle the corner case, where fees have shifted between disconnection and reconnection, negotiation restarts on reconnection.

Note there is limited risk if the closing transaction is delayed, but it will be broadcast very soon; so there is usually no reason to pay a premium for rapid processing.

Will continue...
484 views22:43
Open / Comment
2021-12-01 15:08:33 Closing Initiation: shutdown
Either node (or both) can send a shutdown message to initiate closing, along with the scriptpubkey it wants to be paid to.

type: 38 (shutdown)
data:
[32:channel_id]
[2:len]
[len:scriptpubkey]
Requirements
A sending node:

if it hasn't sent a funding_created (if it is a funder) or a funding_signed (if it is a fundee):

MUST NOT send a shutdown
MAY send a shutdown before a funding_locked, i.e. before the funding transaction has reached minimum_depth.

if there are updates pending on the receiving node's commitment transaction:

MUST NOT send a shutdown.
MUST NOT send an update_add_htlc after a shutdown.

if no HTLCs remain in either commitment transaction:

MUST NOT send any update message after a shutdown.
SHOULD fail to route any HTLC added after it has sent shutdown.

if it sent a non-zero-length shutdown_scriptpubkey in open_channel or accept_channel:

MUST send the same value in scriptpubkey.
MUST set scriptpubkey in one of the following forms:

OP_DUP OP_HASH160 20 20-bytes OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG (pay to pubkey hash), OR
OP_HASH160 20 20-bytes OP_EQUAL (pay to script hash), OR
OP_0 20 20-bytes (version 0 pay to witness pubkey), OR
OP_0 32 32-bytes (version 0 pay to witness script hash)
A receiving node:

if it hasn't received a funding_signed (if it is a funder) or a funding_created (if it is a fundee):
SHOULD fail the connection
if the scriptpubkey is not in one of the above forms:
SHOULD fail the connection.
if it hasn't sent a funding_locked yet:
MAY reply to a shutdown message with a shutdown
once there are no outstanding updates on the peer, UNLESS it has already sent a shutdown:
MUST reply to a shutdown message with a shutdown
if both nodes advertised the option_upfront_shutdown_script feature, and the receiving node received a non-zero-length shutdown_scriptpubkey in open_channel or accept_channel, and that shutdown_scriptpubkey is not equal to scriptpubkey:
MUST fail the connection.
Rationale
If channel state is always "clean" (no pending changes) when a shutdown starts, the question of how to behave if it wasn't is avoided: the sender always sends a commitment_signed first.

As shutdown implies a desire to terminate, it implies that no new HTLCs will be added or accepted. Once any HTLCs are cleared, the peer may immediately begin closing negotiation, so we ban further updates to the commitment transaction (in particular, update_fee would be possible otherwise).

The scriptpubkey forms include only standard forms accepted by the Bitcoin network, which ensures the resulting transaction will propagate to miners.

The option_upfront_shutdown_script feature means that the node wanted to pre-commit to shutdown_scriptpubkey in case it was compromised somehow. This is a weak commitment (a malevolent implementation tends to ignore specifications like this one!), but it provides an incremental improvement in security by requiring the cooperation of the receiving node to change the scriptpubkey.

The shutdown response requirement implies that the node sends commitment_signed to commit any outstanding changes before replying; however, it could theoretically reconnect instead, which would simply erase all outstanding uncommitted changes.

Will continue...
400 views12:08
Open / Comment
2021-11-28 11:27:11 Channel Close
Nodes can negotiate a mutual close of the connection, which unlike a unilateral close, allows them to access their funds immediately and can be negotiated with lower fees.

Closing happens in two stages:

one side indicates it wants to clear the channel (and thus will accept no new HTLCs)

once all HTLCs are resolved, the final channel close negotiation begins.

+-------+ +-------+
| |--(1)----- shutdown -------> | |
| |<-(2)----- shutdown -------- | |
| | | |
| | | |
| A | ... | B |
| | | |
| |--(3)-- closing_signed F1---> | |
| |<-(4)-- closing_signed F2---- | |
| | ... | |
| |--(?)-- closing_signed Fn---> | |
| |<-(?)-- closing_signed Fn---- | |
+-------+ +-------+

Will continue...
320 viewsedited  08:27
Open / Comment
2021-11-23 19:27:18 The funding_signed Message
This message gives the funder the signature it needs for the first commitment transaction, so it can broadcast the transaction knowing that funds can be redeemed, if need be.

This message introduces the channel_id to identify the channel. It's derived from the funding transaction by combining the funding_txid and the funding_output_index, using big-endian exclusive-OR (i.e. funding_output_index alters the last 2 bytes).

type: 35 (funding_signed)
data:
[32:channel_id]
[64:signature]
Requirements
The sender MUST set:

channel_id by exclusive-OR of the funding_txid and the funding_output_index from the funding_created message.
signature to the valid signature, using its funding_pubkey for the initial commitment transaction.
The recipient:

if signature is incorrect:
MUST fail the channel.
MUST NOT broadcast the funding transaction before receipt of a valid funding_signed.
on receipt of a valid funding_signed:
SHOULD broadcast the funding transaction.
The funding_locked Message
This message indicates that the funding transaction has reached the minimum_depth asked for in accept_channel. Once both nodes have sent this, the channel enters normal operating mode.

type: 36 (funding_locked)
data:
[32:channel_id]
[33:next_per_commitment_point]
Requirements
The sender MUST:

wait until the funding transaction has reached minimum_depth before sending this message.
set next_per_commitment_point to the per-commitment point to be used for the following commitment transaction.
A non-funding node (fundee):

SHOULD forget the channel if it does not see the funding transaction after a reasonable timeout.
From the point of waiting for funding_locked onward, either node MAY fail the channel if it does not receive a required response from the other node after a reasonable timeout.

Rationale
The non-funder can simply forget the channel ever existed, since no funds are at risk. If the fundee were to remember the channel forever, this would create a Denial of Service risk; therefore, forgetting it is recommended (even if the promise of push_msat is significant).

Future
An SPV proof could be added and block hashes could be routed in separate messages.

Will continue...
374 views16:27
Open / Comment
2021-11-22 01:48:32 The funding_created Message
This message describes the outpoint which the funder has created for the initial commitment transactions. After receiving the peer's signature, via funding_signed, it will broadcast the funding transaction.

type: 34 (funding_created)
data:
[32:temporary_channel_id]
[32:funding_txid]
[2:funding_output_index]
[64:signature]
Requirements
The sender MUST set:

temporary_channel_id the same as the temporary_channel_id in the open_channel message.
funding_txid to the transaction ID of a non-malleable transaction,
and MUST NOT broadcast this transaction.
funding_output_index to the output number of that transaction that corresponds the funding transaction output, as defined in BOLT #3.
signature to the valid signature using its funding_pubkey for the initial commitment transaction, as defined in BOLT #3.
The sender:

when creating the funding transaction:
SHOULD use only BIP141 (Segregated Witness) inputs.
The recipient:

if signature is incorrect:
MUST fail the channel.
Rationale
The funding_output_index can only be 2 bytes, since that's how it's packed into the channel_id and used throughout the gossip protocol. The limit of 65535 outputs should not be overly burdensome.

A transaction with all Segregated Witness inputs is not malleable, hence the funding transaction recommendation.

Will continue...
325 views22:48
Open / Comment